

21 June 1977

77-793712

DDI
16 June

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

FROM : B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : Admiral Turner's Comments on 17 June DCI Journal (U)

1. [REDACTED] In the margin of item #5 of the 17 June Journal (a summary of your 16 June memorandum to the Deputy Director for Intelligence), the DCI wrote, "Not correct. I only pointed out we cannot disclose to Sovs overhead data after mid May." After comparing your memorandum and his comments to the Journal item, it appears that the infinitive "to protest" used in the Journal might have caused some misunderstanding about your main point [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Perhaps the use of the phrase "to inform the Soviets about" instead of "to protest" would have made it clear that the Director was urging the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs to protect intelligence sources and methods as opposed to recommending policy or a plan of action.

2. [REDACTED] In light of the above, we are changing the record copy.

[REDACTED]

B. C. Evans

Attachment

ES/[REDACTED]:sk
Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - ES Chrono

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

DDI

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

THE DIRECTOR'S DAILY JOURNAL

17 June 1977

INCOMING

- 25X1 1. [] The Ch/SSCI Subcommittee on Special Investigations wrote the DCI thanking him for his letters forwarding explanations concerning allegations of CIA improprieties [] and advised the Director that his subcommittee has decided to conduct a preliminary inquiry into these allegations and will need to examine Agency documents and interview Agency employees. (ES sent to LC for action; info copies to DCI, DDCI, DDO (for EA/PIA), IG, and A/DDCI/[] 25X1

OUTGOING

- 25X1 2. [] The DCI wrote the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal Division/DoJ requesting the Justice Department to register the appropriate admissions and denials to a complaint filed by the Black Panther Party against [] 25X1
- 25X1 [] et al. (Copies to DDCI and GC)

3. []

- 25X1 4. [] The DDCI wrote informing the Commandant, National War College that he agreed to the request to extend the services of [] at NWC through 5 September 1977. (Copy to AO/DCI) 25X1

25X1 *Not correct - I only pointed out we INTERNAL can not disclose to Sops overhead data obtained after mid May*

5. []

- 25X1 6. [] The EA/DCI wrote the LC conveying a request from the DCI to give Senator Hollings (D., SC) an unclassified version of our briefing material on the 200-mile fishing limit if the Senator wants it. (ES sent to LC for action; info copies to DCI, DDCI, DDI, and A/DDCI/[] 25X1

- 25X1 7. [] The EA/DCI wrote informing the DDS&T that the DCI would like a background paper [] (ES sent to DDS&T for action requesting to be advised by phone on how much time is needed on this; info copies to DCI, DDCI, AD/DCI/IC, and A/DDCI/[] 25X1

- 25X1 8. [] The DDCI approved a memo from the DDI recommending that the IC Staff be informed (1) that the CIA has problems with proposed definitions of categories of intelligence which had been forwarded to NFIB members for comment and (2) that the [] be initiated as soon as possible. (Copy to Center for Policy Support)
- 25X1 []

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25X1

9.

☐ The DDCI wrote the DDS&T and DDO setting forth procedures to be followed for overseas deployment of any ☐ team from OSO. (Copies to DCI and D/OSO)

25X1

10.

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt



Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Cy:

I have sent a copy of this memorandum on the 200-mile fishing zone to Zbig; he will be sending it on to Elliot Richardson.

You might like to read it too. I briefed the President on these matters on June 15.

STANSFIELD TURNER

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
The Secretary of State

The Director

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
77-7937

20 June 1977

7, DDI 16 June

Dear Zbig:

Attached is the material on the 200-mile fishing zone you wanted to send to Elliot Richardson. I have sent a copy to Cy Vance, as well.

STANSFIELD TURNER

The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Copy hand delivered to S/Defense on 17 June
and to Sec/State on 18 June by DCI. See DCI
note attached.

*Richard - we use the
DDI distribution*

881
EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDCI <i>Handwritten signature</i>		<i>Handwritten initials</i>
2	DCI		
3			
4	<i>BERNIE: [unclear]</i>		
5	<i>DCI could leave the memo</i>		
6	<i>with Vance if he wished</i>		

<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

To 2:

Enclosed are copies of the briefing on the 200-mile fishing zones that you wanted for Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance. Notes for conveying them are also provided.

Have see my note. BLM

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Deputy Director for Intelligence <i>ST</i>	6/17/77
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET	

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
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Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP80M00165A000300200004-6			
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDCI		
2	DCI		
3			
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <p>To 2:</p> <p>Enclosed are copies of the briefing on the 200-mile fishing zones that you wanted for Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance. Notes for conveying them are also provided.</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Deputy Director for Intelligence <i>SW</i>			6/17/77
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET


FORM NO. 1-67 **237** Use previous editions *USGPO: 1976 - 202-953 (40)

DDI # *2422-77*

Distribution:

Orig - Dr. Brzezinski
 Orig - Secy Vance
 1 - DCI wo/att
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 ODDI/kss/17 Jun 77

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

The Director
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

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
The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
The Secretary of State

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Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs



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
Impact of 200 Mile National Claims on the Soviet
and Japanese Fishing Industries

- I. The failure of the UN-sponsored Law of the Sea conference, after more than three years of negotiations, to establish a comprehensive treaty has led to a proliferation of national 200-mile maritime zones (see map). Currently 44 countries have claimed such boundaries, 20 since the beginning of this year. This trend will probably reduce the fish catch of both the USSR and Japan, the world's two leading distant-water fishing nations, because nearly all the world's prime fishing grounds are within 200-mile zones. Both are trying to hedge against potential losses by extending fisheries aid or establishing joint fishing ventures, especially with less developed countries. Moscow has had a long standing policy of extending fisheries aid, but recently has emphasized joint ventures to diversify and increase access to potential fishing grounds. Japan has established some 200 joint ventures to protect its supply. Over the next several years these steps and others such as increased imports will probably allow both countries to offset the impact of the 200 mile zones.
 - A. The Soviet fish catch of about 10 million tons in 1975 -- 15% of the world catch of some 70 million tons -- could be reduced by 2.0-2.5 million tons this year in areas where quotas have been recently imposed (see table 1).

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200 Mile Maritime Zones



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- 200 mile maritime zone
- 200 mile national claim expected later in 1977
- 200 mile national claim in force

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
Table 1
Major Fishing Nations: Catch and Consumption

Country	Catch (Million Tons)				Annual Per Capita Consumption	
	1976	1975		1971-75	KG	As % of Animal Protein
	Estimated		Of which taken in foreign 200-mile zones	Average		
Japan	9.0	10.5	3.7	10.5	58.0	56
USSR	10.6	9.9	6.0	8.6	16.8	15
China	6.9	6.9	n.a.	6.9	10.0	30
Peru	4.4	3.4	negl.	5.0	7.6	n.a.
US	2.7	2.8	negl.	2.8	5.5	5
Norway	3.1	2.6	n.a.	2.9	22.5	n.a.
India	2.4	2.3	n.a.	2.0	4.0	n.a.
South Korea	2.5	2.1	0.4	1.7	32.0	67
Denmark	1.9	1.8	n.a.	1.6	39.1	n.a.
Spain	1.6	1.5	n.a.	1.5	33.6	n.a.

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1. The Soviet fishing fleet -- largest and most aggressive in the world -- allows Moscow to fish around the world (see chart). The Soviet Union has reported that 60% of its catch -- some 6 million tons -- comes from within 200 miles of other countries' coasts.
 2. The Soviet catch in US waters reached over 1 million tons in 1975, but their quota under the new US 200-mile fishing zone established in March will restrict their take to about 650,000 tons this year. Restrictions imposed by Canada, the EC and other countries could cut the Soviet fish catch in foreign waters by an additional 2 million tons.
 3. The USSR has had problems adapting to the new US fishing regulations. The Soviets have received over 120 violations and citations from the US, more than any other foreign fishing fleet. During May, however, only 11 violations and citations were issued, apparently as Soviet captains became more familiar with US regulations.
- B. Japan, the world's largest fishing nation with a catch of 10.5 million tons in 1975, will fare somewhat better than the Soviet Union.
1. In 1975 only 35% of its total catch was

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1. Including fishing vessels, fish carriers, and fish processing ships more than 100 gross register tons.

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taken within 200 miles of foreign countries.

2. The largest catch was in US waters, where more than 1.4 million tons were harvested. Under the new US fishing quotas, Japan will still be allowed to take 1.2 million tons.
3. Japan faces very heavy cuts in Soviet waters, however, as Moscow will probably reserve these areas for the Soviet fleet. Japan caught nearly 1.4 million tons off the USSR in 1975.

II. Both Moscow and Tokyo are taking steps to cut their losses -- either by restricting foreign fishing in their own waters or by producing aid for foreign fisheries or joint fishing ventures in new areas.

A. On March 1, Moscow established a 200-mile fishing zone off its coasts, where foreign fleets took over 2 million tons of fish during 1975. Japan and South Korea accounted for 1.8 million tons of that amount, part of which undoubtedly will now be allocated to the Soviet fleet.

1. The Soviets have not been in a hurry to negotiate new fishing quotas. Moscow has refused to negotiate a fishing agreement with the South Koreans on grounds that the two countries have no diplomatic relations. Even if Moscow changes its position, Seoul's take in Soviet waters would probably be cut

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by 50 percent or more.

2. The Soviets and the Japanese have been involved in negotiations for a new fisheries agreement since late February, but the talks have been stalemated until recently over Moscow's efforts to secure an agreement that would deny Japanese claims to the Northern Territories -- a group of islands the Soviets seized from Japan in the closing days of World War II.
 3. On 27 May it was announced that the quota of fish and marine products that could be taken by Japanese fishermen in Soviet waters would be 700,000 tons, half the total taken by the Japanese in the same areas in 1976. This figure included 245,000 tons taken by the Japanese in March 1977. The number of Japanese fishing vessels to be allowed in Soviet waters will be cut 15%.
- B. The Soviets are expected to continue their long-standing program of fisheries aid to LDCs and will try to expand their newer policy of joining in fishing ventures with companies in developing nations.
1. The Soviets in the last 15 years have signed agreements to provide fisheries aid to 33 developing countries and remain the only fishing country to extend such

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assistance. As of May 1977, the USSR had committed over \$230 million to Third World countries for assisting the development of local fishing industries. (See Tables 2 and 3).

2. The early Soviet aid initiative was geared largely to satisfying the requirements of Russia's own fishing fleet. The use of larger refrigerated vessels and factory ship were extending the fleet's time at sea and making it more heavily dependent on support from other countries around the world. In exchange for small outlays to developing countries for fisheries aid, the Soviets were able to obtain services needed by their far-flung fishing fleet. Aid agreements provided grants or long-term credits that were repaid with LDC services, such as the use of LDC repair facilities, refueling privileges, transfer of crews, and onshore processing.
3. These agreements were concluded with willing LDCs adjacent to all major Soviet fishing areas, initially in the Atlantic and eventually in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans. The increase in Soviet interest in fisheries agreements coincided with substantial technical improvements in Soviet fishing operations that allowed

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Table 2

Soviet Assistance Extended to Less Developed Countries
For Fisheries and Maritime Development
1956 - 31 March 1977

Million US

	<u>Fisheries¹</u>
<u>TOTAL²</u>	<u>230.0</u>
<u>Africa</u>	<u>102.2</u>
Algeria	4.5
Angola	1.5
Benin	0.5
Cape Verde Islands	..
Equatorial Guinea	0.5
Gambia	2.0
Ghana	11.2
Guinea	7.8
Guinea-Bissau	1.5
Kenya	2.0
Mauritania	7.0
Mauritius	6.5
Morocco	3.1
Mozambique	5.0
Senegal	4.4
Sierra Leone	5.0
Somalia	38.4
Sudan	0.4
Tanzania	0.9
Tunisia	..
<u>Middle East</u>	<u>74.1</u>
Egypt	16.5
Iran	9.3
Iraq	25.0
North Yemen	7.8
South Yemen	15.5
Syria	..
<u>South and East Asia</u>	<u>25.7</u>
Bangladesh	15.0
India	2.2
Indonesia	0.3
Malaysia	1.5
Maldives	0.1
Pakistan	3.6
Sri Lanka	3.0

Soviet Assistance Extended to Less Developed Countries
For Fisheries and Maritime Development
1956 - 31 March 1977
(Continued)

Million US \$

	<u>Fisheries</u>
<u>Latin America</u>	<u>24.5</u>
Argentina	5.0
Chile	17.0
Peru	2.5
<u>Europe</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Greece	..
Portugal	0.5

- ¹ In the case of joint ventures, only the aid portion is included here.
- ² Includes estimated value of agreements, where date not available.
- ³ Purely commercial fisheries transaction include Kuwait, Philippines, Singapore, Spain and Tunisia.
- ⁴ Program discontinued.

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Status Of Soviet Joint Fishing Ventures a/
with Less Developed Countries
As of 31 March 1977

Agreement Signed

Angola

Benin

Egypt

Ghana

Guinea-Bissau

Iraq

Mauritania

Mauritius

Morocco

Mozambique

Philippines

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Spain

Somalia

South Yemen

Sri Lanka

Tunisia

Offer Under Negotiation

Argentina

Bangladesh

Ecuador

Gambia

Guyana

Indonesia

Liberia

Malaysia

Peru

a/ Joint ownership which in some cases involves Soviet
aid to LDCs beyond Soviet equity participation.

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for longer periods at sea.

4. By 1971 Moscow pressed LDCs to engage in joint ventures that would give the Soviets a voice in LDC domestic fishing operations and somewhat more direct control of services. It also guaranteed the Soviets fishing rights in territorial waters of cooperating LDCs. This advantage has become particularly important with the spread of the 200 mile zone.
5. The USSR has now joined in fishing ventures with 18 developing countries and negotiations with another nine countries are in progress. (See map). The USSR usually contributes 49% of the capital for an equivalent share in management and profits. The LDC partner takes its share of the catch for local distribution; the remainder is frozen and taken back to the USSR or sold in Western markets. These joint ventures involve a small investment with high rates of return. Soviet vessels, leased or purchased by the joint company, are jointly manned and used for training, research, and fishing. The Soviet fleet is given access to waters within the territorial limits and provided services usually

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established and managed by the joint enterprises which gives the Soviets an important role.

C. Japan has also started adapting to the new realities of international fishing.

1. It has established a 12 mile territorial limit and will implement a 200-mile fishing zone later this year.
2. It also has launched a \$700 million, seven year program to increase yields in Japanese coastal waters. Tokyo is likely to try to reduce Soviet fishing in its waters, though enforcement will be difficult due to the small size of the Japanese navy.
3. The Japanese also have been active in establishing joint ventures, especially in the US. Japan now has more than 200 joint fishing companies around the world -- more than 30 of these ventures are operating along the US Pacific coast and in Alaska. Total capitalization is estimated at about \$150 million, half of which is Japanese.

III. The reduced Soviet and Japanese catches could adversely affect diets in each country, both of which are heavily dependent on fish as sources of animal protein.

A. In 1975, Soviet per capita consumption of fish

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was 16.8 kilograms, which comprised about 15 percent of the animal protein in the Soviet diet. According to the current five year plan (1976-1980), per capita fish consumption is to increase to almost 21 kilograms in 1980 -- a goal that now will be difficult to achieve.

B. In Japan consumption of fish products accounted for more than half the animal protein in the average diet in 1975. The share was considerably higher for low-income families.

IV. Moscow could lessen the impact of the reduced catch on the Soviet diet, but only at the expense of scarce foreign exchange. Soviet fish products are sold around the world; they have nearly tripled in volume since 1970 to 500,000 tons. Hard-currency earnings from fish exports amounted to roughly \$100 million in 1975.

V. Japan is committed to maintaining its current level of fish consumption.

A. Since 1970, domestic consumption of fish has outpaced the increase in the country's catch, forcing Tokyo to shift from a net exporter to a large net importer. Fish imports exceeded exports by almost \$700 million in 1975, with imports supplying 15 percent of consumption requirements.

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B. Japan can afford to increase its imports of fish, especially from the US. Last year, Japan's trade surplus worldwide was \$10 billion, half of which was with the US.

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77/7937

16 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Executive Assistant to the DCI

1. The Director briefed the President and Dr. Brzezinski on the necessity of not informing the Soviets of any information [redacted] after mid-May. He would like to send a note to Mr. Warnke on this, unless we are absolutely sure that he has that picture well in hand.

25X1

a. The Director took responsibility for advising those to whom we send future intelligence on Tyuratam whether or not it can be released to the Soviets.

[redacted]

2. Dr. Brzezinski asked the Director for a copy of our briefing materials on the 200-mile fishing zone. He will send it to Ambassador Richardson. The Director will provide a copy of these briefing materials to Secretary Vance at their next meeting with a brief explanation.

[redacted]

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[redacted]


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


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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

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